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Abstract
I present evidence that communication between marketplace partici-
pants is an important influence on market demand. I find that consumer
demand is approximately equally influenced by communication on both
formal and informal networks- namely, product reviews and community
forums. In addition, I find empirical evidence of a vendor’s ability to
commit to disclosure dampening the effect of communication on demand.
I also find that product demand is more responsive to average customer
sentiment as the number of messages grows, as may be expected in a
Bayesian updating framework.
1 Introduction
Product information is essential for markets to function well. Without accurate
knowledge of what they are buying, consumers cannot be expected to maximize
personal welfare over the set of product choices. Of course, product character-
istics that affect a consumer’s ability to optimize in a marketplace go beyond
knowledge of its individual components. In the absence of strong institutions,
consumer’s might greatly value a seller’s reputation, or be concerned that a seller
might cheat them, particularly if they are unable to observe product quality at
time of purchase. Of critical importance in this setting would be the avenues
through which consumers can collect information about the product space they
seek to purchase from.
In this paper, I examine a market with exactly these characteristics, and
attempt to measure the relative importance of differential modes of informa-
tion transmission in relation to consumer demand. Specifically, I study the
demand for illegal products on online “Darknet” markets, which lack credible
enforcement of laws and so must rely on incentives from vendor reputation and
consumers being appropriately informed to function well,. Because of this and
the concentrated set of locations where consumers can gather information about
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products, I am able to plausibly estimate the impact of product sentiment on
future market demand, by controlling for all feasible supply-side decisions that
may impact consumer demand. By “sentiment”, I mean whether a vendor is
being talked about in a positive or negative way, as measured by the word struc-
ture in the message. I find that both informal and formal communication (as
measured by forum post and product review sentiment, respectively) have a
large effect on consumer demand, and that these effects are comparable in mag-
nitude. I find that these effects scale with sample size of the information set
, but little other evidence for heterogeneity in the effects of product sentiment
from varying the information sources.
My marketplace is the illegal online market for illicit products, such as guns,
narcotics, and fraud services, commonly known as the “Darknet” of the Internet.
Due to the illegal nature of all transactions being performed1, this marketplace
is highly anonymous. Vendors and sellers alike are potentially culpable in the
distribution of these goods, which in developed countries such as the United
States, can result in up to 15 years of imprisonment [4]. In addition to the clear
personal incentives one might have to remain anonymous, anonymity is enforced
by requiring users to connect to these online marketplaces via the TOR protocol.
TOR is a specific type of Internet routing service that scrambles ones personal
data packets by interchanging them with the data packets of other current active
TOR users [6]. The net result is that an observer, whether a government or a
private organization, is unable to tell what IP address a traced data request is
coming from, thereby offering an additional layer of security for both customers
and vendors. On top of this, all transactions on the marketplace are done
in Bitcoins, a popular cryptocurrency notorious for its ability to anonymize
transactions.
Besides the strong protections of anonymity used by the market, Darknet
marketplaces operates like virtually any other e-commerce website. Listings are
organized into relevant product categories (LSD, Opiods, Firearms, etc.), and
customers can use a search engine to locate any specific product they wish to
consume or vendor they wish to buy from. On an actual product page, buyers
can view a provided description and image of the product from the seller, in
addition to the full history of customer reviews from previous buyers, which
each have a 0 to 5 star rating, a brief text description provided by previous
buyer about their purchase experience and/or the quality of the product, and
how long ago the review was made. In addition, the product page has summary
statistics on the vendor, such as average rating across all products, total volume
of transactions, where the buyer ships to/from in the world, along with a link to
a vendor’s profile page where one can view past reviews of all previously bought
products. Figure 1 provides an example of a typical listing on the Darknet
marketplace I use as my universe for this paper, Agora.
One rather unique feature of these Darknet markets is that, in order for
customers to finalize the transaction, buyers are required to leave a review
1even if the product itself is legal in a given country, no government taxes are ever paid by
the vendors, so they are always illegal.
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once they have received the product. In order to ensure the market functions
while guaranteeing agent anonymity, Darknet markets use an escrow system,
where the marketplace acts as clearinghouse and transfers the Bitcoins from the
buyer to the vendor only after the consumer verifies that they have received the
product they ordered and leaves their review. The reasons for this are threefold:
1. If every customer is required to leave a review, then the set of reviews
are less likely to be biased towards customers with “extreme” experiences,
either good or bad, and so the reviews might be more informative. Thus,
they provide incentives for suppliers to be reliable, and for customers to
go ahead with a purchase if they are initially uncertain about the product.
2. Introducing a third party intermediary further anonymizes the payment
process.
3. If a customer receives an item and has legitimate evidence of the product
not matching its advertised description, they may submit a complaint to
the marketplace’s moderators, and, if found to be true, the complaint will
result in the vendor not being paid and possibly banned from the website.
This makes fraud costly and further incentivizes vendors to be honest and
avoid scamming customers.
However, a somewhat unfortunate consequence of this well meaning rule is that
many vendors explicitly require customers to “Finalize Early” when receiving
products. This practice involves customers finalizing their transactions with the
market clearinghouse in advance of the vendor actually shipping the product,
so that the vendor does not have to wait for delivery to receive the payment, a
process that can sometimes take weeks. A customer may later edit their review
appropriately to match their actual experience, but it is common for a reviewer
to mandate that those who finalize early also give a 5-star review; otherwise they
will not fulfill the transaction. Part of what originally motivated this paper’s
investigation into text sentiment was the common practice in Darknet markets
of mandating 5-star reviews on finalize early orders, but little done to regulate
the text accompanying the review (possibly because it is not an input into a
vendor’s overall rating, or possibly because it is much more difficult to filter
text). Perhaps because of the anarcho-libertarian ideology that surrounded the
creation of these Darknet marketplaces, this practice was not explicitly banned
by moderators, since advertisers are transparent about this requirement if you
wish to purchase from them. Instead, moderators built an explicit “No Finalize
Early” flag placed on all listings in search results so that consumers could easily
filter out product offerings that may require finalize early. Misclassifying one’s
product listing as no finalize early can result in fines to the vendor and in some
cases banning the vendor altogether from the market.
One can imagine that all of this taken together implies a huge premium
on a vendor’s reputation. Despite the protections put in place, this market
should still gravitate towards a set of well-established vendors who are well
known to serve customers honestly. For this reason, changes in attributes of
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a vendor reputation (such as community attitudes towards them) should have
more pronounced effects in this market, leading to more precise estimations of
their effects.
There is a limited literature on Darknet markets due to both their recent
inception and illicit nature. Most of the work is done from a criminology per-
spective, explaining the difference in structures between Darknet markets and
traditional illegal drug rings or cartels. One of the first studies of Darknet
markets by Christin [3] provides a comprehensive measurement analysis of the
Darknet market during its initial stages when it consisted of one website. De-
mant et al. [5] is one of the first papers to examine the Darknet from a social
science perspective. They investigate whether consumers on the Darknet are
redistributers or direct consumers, and find suggestive evidence that consumers
on the Darknet resemble direct-to-consumer sellers, a step below in the drug
supply chain.
There is some relevant work that has been done on the importance of commu-
nication in online settings. Lewis [9] examines the effects of differential vendor
communication or advertisement on sales in eBay’s online platform for buying
and selling used cars. Luca & Georgios [10] study the incentives of vendors
listed on Yelp to procure review fraud in order to boost their own ratings on
the website.
2 Consumer Model
The market I study is one in which consumers choose to purchase different types
of good (mostly different types of drugs). I assume that demand for product j
in time interval t is given by a Poisson distribution:
Pr(yjt units purchased|X = e
yβXe−e
βX
yjt!
More importantly, the result of this functional form is that our expectation has
a straightforward exponential form:
E[yjt|Xj,t, µj ] = eXj,tβ+µj
Where Xj,t is a vector of time and product varying characteristics, and µj is
a product-specific effect on average product demand. More plainly, I model
my covariates of interest, Xj,t, as having a multiplicative e
β effect on (mean)
product demand for every 1-unit change.
While it is well known that product demand is unobservable, since prices and
quantities are results of both demand and supply schedules clearing, I argue in
this paper that, due to the unique properties of the market I study, a researcher
can observe virtually everything suppliers choose here that are observable to
customers. And thus, a researcher can plausibly control for all supply-side
decisions a seller takes that impact a consumer’s choice. Thus, assuming all
supply decisions are perfectly controlled for, remaining variation in sales can
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be explained as a combination of demand-side variation and noise. From here,
I take relevant covariates not determined by the supplier, and determine their
effect on consumer demand.
My demand-side covariates will mostly examine the effects of peer commu-
nication on a vendor’s reputation and hence the demand for their products.
I examine the impact of two channels of reputation formation: sentiment or
satisfaction displayed by past customers on a product’s review page, and sen-
timent concerning a vendor on the designated market forum, which was specif-
ically established so customers could communicate to each other about events
or products within the market. I designate these two channels as “formal” and
“informal” communication, since one exists in the formal marketplace setting,
where consumers are asked to explicitly review a product, while the other exists
in a social setting where users are free to spontaneously discuss whatever they
wish. This may sometimes include experiences on buying from certain vendors.
I expect that both of these are crucially important to the demand in this mar-
ket. Because there are virtually no other places on the Internet for consumers
to communicate with each other (largely due to criminality concerns), vendor
ratings, past reviews, and the forums are the only ways for potential customers
to collect information about a product or seller.
It is clear, especially since reviews are required of every past customer, that
this will be one of the primary channels for customers to collect information on
whether a vendor is selling high or low quality products, and whether or not they
are committing fraud. Ex ante, though, it is not obvious that customers would
highly value positive or negative reviews of vendors on forums. Since forum
posts can be written by anyone, not just past customers, a consumer might
view a vendor review on a forum as “cheap talk” since it is costless for a single
user to send an arbitrary message on the forums, and thus they may ignore this
information entirely. And so, especially since the author’s utility is unlikely to
be determined by the potential customer’s purchase decision, the outcome may
be a babbling equilibrium where forum messages are entirely noninformative
[7]. At the same time, one might imagine there are sufficient incentives for
forum members to accumulate social capital among their peers and obtain a
reputation to be a member in good-standing with the community (See Wasko &
Faraj [13] for an investigation of incentives for knowledge sharing in an Internet
forum setting). Given the limited means for consumers to collect information, I
hypothesize that in this marketplace, sentiment of vendors displayed on forums
will have an influential role in customer demand. In addition, I propose the
following hypotheses for how consumer demand will depend on differing sources
of vendor sentiment, which I test later in the paper:
• Hypothesis 1: Customers will value vendor sentiment more highly as
evidence accumulates; that is, if there are more reviews, all else equal,
the customer, in a Bayesian fashion, will value the mean vendor sentiment
more (relative to their prior) when formulating posterior beliefs.
• Hypothesis 2: Customers will value vendor sentiment more highly from
experienced customers versus inexperienced customers. By experienced
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customers, I mean customers that in some sense have a longer history of
interactions on the marketplace from which to draw from. Given this,
experienced customers are more likely to be well informed, and so their
input should be more heavily weighted by customers making purchase
decisions.
• Hypothesis 3: Customers will value vendor sentiment from peer com-
munication less if product is a “no finalize early” purchase. The reason
for this hypothesis stems from the disclosure literature. Those listings
with a no finalize early flag are credibly committing quality disclosure of
their product within a neighborhood of its true quality, since customers
can themselves assess the quality of the product before finalizing the pur-
chase. When this quality disclosure is credible, a sophisticated buyer and
seller will be able to communicate the full information quality in equilib-
rium [11]. As a result, vendor sentiment will not be as important for the
demand of no finalize early products; consumers should be able to rely on
the vendor’s own provided information on the product listing page, com-
pared to those products which may require customers to finalize early.
• Hypothesis 4: Customers will find the review sentiment for a product
on its listing page to be more important than sentiment for the vendor’s
other products. I hypothesize that reviews on the product page are more
tailored or relevant towards the purchase of this product. For example,
reviews of other products from the same vendor may be informative on
how a vendor’s customer service is, but may not contain information about
the quality of the specific product a consumer is interested in purchasing.
Therefore, product demand will be more impacted by review sentiment for
the specific product, rather than sentiment about the overall vendor (as
captured by review sentiment on all other product listings by the vendor).
3 Data
For my analysis, I use three datasets concerning the anonymous market for
drugs on the Internet. All of these datasets were generously uploaded for public
usage by Gwern Branwen [14].
The first dataset is comprised of weekly, complete, sets of listings available on
all Darknet marketplaces from a central Darknet search engine named GRAMS.
GRAMS interacts with the API of major marketplaces on the Darknet to ob-
tain a complete set of listings on each marketplace. However, the information
GRAMS provides is more basic than that contained in some of the datasets I
describe below, a trade-off that must be weighed against its relative complete-
ness. GRAMS has for each item the description, price, and seller name, along
with a field for which Darknet market (Silk Road 2, Evolution, Agora, etc.) it is
being sold on. Namely, it does not contain any sales data or review data for each
listing. I use the GRAMS dataset as a sort of validation set to compare with
my incomplete HTML marketplace data, as well as for testing vendor responses
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to changes in sentiment on an extensive margin.
I use some of the evidence in this GRAMS dataset to determine which mar-
ketplace websites would be best to study. Figure 3 shows the percent of listings
(from the complete GRAMS data) on the Darknet from three of the largest
marketplaces on the Darknet from 2014 to mid 2015. The sample period can
be broken up into three phases; before The Silk Road 2 went offline (red line),
before Evolution went offline (blue line), and after. On November 6th, 2014,
The Silk Road 2 server (started as a successor to the infamous original Darknet
market, The Silk Road) was seized by U.S. customs authorities and brought
offline [8]. It did not enjoy as large of a market share as its predecessor, partly
due to a loss of a first mover advantage, and partly due to its buggy interface.
Evolution, on the other hand, enjoys the largest market share during the sample
period I later focus on (the year 2014). Known for its high degree of security
(unlike Silk Road 2), Evolution suddenly, without notice, went offline on March
14th, 2015, to the bewilderment of it’s users. It was confirmed by moderators
on the website that the owners of the site “cashed out” and stole the asset hold-
ings of vendors currently in escrow on the website, estimated to be worth $12
million USD [15].Because of the abrupt and peculiar circumstances surrounding
the closing of the two other markets, I chose to not include these as the main
object of study for this paper. Compare this to the shutdown of Agora, the
other major market during this period, whose owners publicly announced in
August 2015 that they were going to indefinitely take the website offline due
to the increasing risk associated with running a Darknet website and security
concerns. Everyone’s asset holdings on the market were returned free of charge.
Considering the sincere nature of it’s exit from the marketplace , along with its
relatively high market share, Agora seemed to be the best candidate market to
study.
The second dataset I use consists of approximately biweekly HTML scrapes
of one of the Darknet’s most prominent markets for drugs, Agora, from January
2014 to July 2015. The sample period I use for this research is data from the
2014 calendar year . These scrapes contain a rich amount of unstructured data
on product listings on the market. Namely, they contain the complete product
description provided by the vendor, an (optional) image of the product, the
overall rating of the seller alongside the number of transactions the vendor has
previously engaged in, shipping location, price, and partitions of the products
into categories. Within categories, listings (theoretically) vary only on quantity
and quality. In addition, each product page contains a history of reviews for the
specific listing from previous customers, much in the style of online marketplaces
such as Amazon and eBay. The web pages contain everything a consumer con-
sidering a purchase might see. Due to the instability of the TOR network that
is required to connect to these online marketplaces, and semi-frequent DDOS
attacks on the servers hosting the marketplace, many of these website scrapes
are incomplete and often only cover a fraction of the listings on the marketplace
on any given day. As a result, the observed time series of any individual product
listing may be randomly right or left censored. For example, I might observe a
listing in November of 2014 and never see it again, possibly because the vendor
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took the listing off the market soon after that scrape, or because the vendor left
the listing on the site for an additional 2 months, but subsequent scrapes failed
to arrive at the URL associated with that listing when crawling the website.
The crawling procedure is described in [14] and more or less follows a recur-
sively defined random walk. Because of this, I can treat the listings I do observe
as i.i.d. observations from the marketplace, since the random nature of the we-
bcrawl ensures missingness will be unrelated to unobservable characteristics of
the product.
The third and final dataset used in this paper is weekly scrapes of the Agora
forums. On the Darknet, each marketplace typically has an accompanying forum
where buyers and sellers can discuss offerings on the markets. Importantly,
this is the main place where customers can discuss whether certain vendors are
selling high or low quality items, or whether they are “scams”. Due to the highly
illegal and anonymous nature of the marketplace, it is very difficult to externally
validate the quality of a listing. Importantly, these forums are virtually the
only venue prospective buyers can go to for more information on the product.
Consumers cannot go to typical online social networks for fear of being identified
as a buyer or seller of illegal products. Since the Agora forums also require a Tor
connection to anonymize users, it is a relatively safe area to discuss legitimate
questions on products and sellers. The only other known place on the Internet
where some discussions of Darknet markets occurs is Reddit, but the discussion
is relatively limited for confidentiality concerns. The number of threads from
2014 in the Agora subreddit was 1,551; as a comparison, in this same period,
the number of forumn threads in the Agora Forums was 52,058. Even among
the relevant subforums I devote my analysis to, that are explicitly designated
to contain topics directly related to the marketplace, have 10 times as many
threads as this subreddit during this period. Due to the concentrated nature
of information on Darknet markets, the combination of the HTML of both the
marketplace and the forum means that one can theoretically obtain a complete
picture of the information customers would have had access to when deciding
on a purchase. For this reason, I can completely characterize the information
customers obtain from both formal (reviews) and informal (forum posts) means
in this marketplace, which is what makes it such a uniquely interesting market
to study.
The forum data has information on the subject text of individual thread,
what topic the thread is in (General Discussion, Vendor Discussion,etc.) as well
as the text of replies to the thread. In addition, each post is accompanied with
information about the author, including the username of the author (which is
the same as their username in the Agora marketplace), how active and expe-
rienced the user is, whether the author is classified as a seller by Agora, and
overall favorability of the author’s posts, as measured by “karma”, much like
favorability measures employed on social media websites such as Reddit.
Like the marketplace data, these HTML scrapes are often incomplete due
to bandwidth limitations of the Tor network; however, because the forums are
cumulative (posts are typically not removed after they are posted, and the forum
website stores all threads in the history of its existence), I am more likely to
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observe the vast majority of posts in the data. It is for this reason that I limit
my analysis of the Agora marketplace to the calendar year 2014, even though
the data extends to July 2015. This will allow me to compile a more complete
set of threads in my time period of interest, due to one of the most complete
scrapes occurring in January 2015. Since threads are uniquely identified with
an iterative integer (i.e. the first thread on the forums would have ID 1, the
second thread has ID 2 etc.), I can also directly calculate the percentage of
threads I am able to observe in the data. By this calculation, I observe 35,420
of 52,058 (68.04%) of all the threads that have ever occurred on the forum.
While some of the missing threads are due to the incompleteness of scrapes, it
is likely that a substantial portion of missing threads are due to removal of a
thread by moderators (for either being listed in the incorrect topic or violating
the rules of the forum; spam is a common issue), so this should be considered a
conservative lower bound on my coverage of the forum threads.
The basic unit of observation in this paper will be the time series of each
listing on the marketplace. For each item, I observe every time it is sold, via
the mandatory review, along with the date the transaction was completed (i.e.
when the user reports they have received the product and completes the escrow
transaction). From this, I can construct the number of transactions finalized
each day, and use this as a proxy for the number of purchases each day. This
follows the methodology used to measure sales in the modest literature that
has studied Darknet markets. In order to reduce the impact of measurement
error on the observed date of a sale, as well as to expedite computations, I
aggregate the daily time series of sales data for each item to a weekly time
series. I then incorporate vendor and item characteristics (price, average review
rating, vendor rating, etc.) to construct a panel dataset of market listings over
time, measured in weeks. As mentioned before, these time series will suffer from
censoring because of the incomplete nature of the web crawls used to generate
the dataset. I cannot be sure that an item that shows up for the first time in
the web scrapes was not listed earlier on the marketplace, but simply missed
by earlier scrapes. In this way, the listing time series’ will suffer from random
censoring, since the mechanism by which the series is censored (both left and
right censorship are possible) is unrelated to any characteristics of the product
itself. Because of this, the effect of the censoring on statistical inference will be
limited, and I ignore it’s impact on my estimates for coefficients.
Table 1 contains summary statistics of my panel dataset. As is evident in
the table, product sales are relatively sparse (about 1 sale every 3 weeks per
item). Across our sample period, we have 50,000 unique product from which to
draw inference, sold by 2,000 different vendors. Both vendor ratings and item
ratings are extremely high on average. Prices show extraordinary dispersion;
this is mostly due to a couple of outlier listings that probably were mistakes by
the vendor (possibly meant to put the price in USD terms); when the maximum
price is excluded, the standard deviation is reduced by a factor of 10. To avoid
these outliers altering the estimations, I log-transform prices whenever they are
input into a regression equation. Table 1 also summarizes the # of reviews by
item / vendor, the average # of mentions of a vendor on the forums, and the
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sentiment score variables we use later in the analysis. I now proceed to discuss
how I take the rich text data from both reviews and forum threads, and turn it
into useful covariates for regression analysis.
4 Transforming Communication into Data
4.1 Vendor Sentiment in Text
In the absence of verifiable information from sellers, buyers must seek alterna-
tive means of acquiring information on the quality or veracity of a particular
product. I consider two avenues by which consumers acquire information. The
first is through customer reviews. Since these reviews are required, by design
they should convey a relatively broad cross-section of past customer experiences.
In practice, reviews are heavily biased upwards, resulting in a coarsening of in-
formation available to consumers. There is an immense pressure on Agora to
give a vendor a 5-star rating for a product you purchase, in part because of the
potential danger one risks by giving a distributor of illegal goods one’s address
(even if it is just a nearby P.O. Box). Many explicitly request it on their listing
page, much like finalizing early. In fact, in my sample 97.7% of reviews are 5
out 5 stars (one can rate a purchase from 0 to 5 stars). Vendors care a lot about
this rating since a vendor’s overall rating (an unweighted average of reviews on
their products) is embedded into every active product listing by the vendor. In
contrast, there are no widely distributed “averages” for the accompanying text
required with each review. For this reason, I hypothesize that text, even in
reviews with biased ratings, can provide valuable information to a prospective
customer. In order to extract this information from the text, I use natural lan-
guage processing methods to construct a “sentiment” variable associated with
each review text that measures the relative positive or negative sentiment as-
sociated with a given product review, based on how certain words associate
with customer sentiment of their purchase experience. After pre-processing the
review text (removing stopwords, non alpha-numeric characters, as well as con-
verting it to lowercase) using the Natural Language Processing Toolkit (NLTK)
[1], I decompose a review text into a matrix of word counts, and normalize
the rows to sum to 1 (so the matrix consists of rows of word frequencies in
an observed review). I then use multinomial inverse regression (MNIR) [12] to
relate these frequencies to positive or negative product sentiment. Specifically,
I assume that text for customer reviews is generated from a sequence of i.i.d.
draws of words wi from a multinomial
wi ∼Multinomial(p,mi), pj = e
αj+φjri+ij
Σkeαk+φkri+ik
whose probability vector p is a is determined by a latent measure of customer
satisfaction of customer i, ri. Here, k indexes words across the entire vocabulary
considered, while αj and φj denote word-specific intercept and slope coefficients
to relate each word’s probability to r. I measure customer satisfaction with the
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star rating of a review each text is associated with. Even though this variable
suffers from the bias and coarsening issues I just discussed above, this regres-
sion method should be able to identify strongly positive and negative text that
accompanied all reviews, and give a better sense of whether, for example, the
sample of 5-star reviews are really consistently associated with text as positive
as the perfect rating given to vendors.
To calibrate this multinomial model’s hyperparameters, I choose 10 regular-
ization paths for the estimation (for computational tractability), and a hyper-
parameter choice of γ = 0, which amounts to a complexity penalty equivalent
to that found in lasso regression. I also choose to drop all words from the esti-
mation procedure that do not appear at least 5 times in the set of ≈ 200, 000
reviews I study. I do this because it reduces the vocabulary I need to consider
in the model(from about 23,000 to 6,000 unique stemmed words), which signif-
icantly eases the estimation computationally. At the same time, however, these
“scarce” words are unlikely to be very informative about consumer sentiment
and might result in extreme estimates for the score loadings φ that are only
based on a couple of observations. The choice of 5 words as the cutoff is an
arbitrary choice I made that seemed reasonable in the tradeoff between limiting
extreme knife-edge estimates for φ, and excessive censoring of text.
After estimating the multiomial model of word draws based on sentiment,
I extract score loadings φ associated with the star-rating for each word and
apply these to the observed review text to construct the sufficient reduction
projection scores si = Σk∈iwkφk, for each review. This score will capture all
the available information in the text related to customer sentiment, in the sense
that the review rating will now be orthogonal to the review text, conditional on
the score variable [12].
Table 2 shows the 20 most negative and positive words from the estima-
tion in terms of their associated scores, alongside the observed frequency of
each word and the average rating of reviews that contain each of these words.
Both the negative and positive words are stems we might expect; 3 out of 20 of
the most negative words allude to the product being a “scam”, and the others
mostly refer to either dishonesty on the part of the vendor or warn other cus-
tomers to steer clear. In contrast, the positively scored words appear to signal
praise for the vendor, or mention a positive experience with the delivery of the
product. Notably, only 4 of the 40 words that occupy the extremes of the score
spectrum actually explicitly refer to the quality characteristics of the product
itself. The other high-scoring words appear to be concerned with the quality
of the vendor themself. This may be because I am estimating sentiment from
reviews across all types of product categories. Within each category, different
words may be used to describe a product as low or high quality. I would not
expect the word “medibud”, for example, to be associated with a positive re-
view of prescription pills. At the same time, all products listed on Agora suffer
from common concerns and issues with delivery of the goods or reliability of
a vendor. In this sense, my model is limited in that it will likely have diffi-
culty identifying sentiment concerning “product-specific quality” as opposed to
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“vendor-specific quality” 2, but at the same time this identification strategy will
prove useful when I analyze vendor quality sentiment in the forums. Another
limitation of my approach will be that I do not account for the estimation error
from the MNIR model in my later regression analysis when I use the scores si
as inputs; I take the output of the model as the true estimates. Correcting for
this would involve boostrapping over the sample of reviews, re-estimating the
MNIR model, and then performing all subsequent analysis using the random
sample of reviews. Due to the intense computational requirements of both the
MNIR estimation and the later regression analysis I perform, it is excessively
cumbersome to do this analysis multiple times at this stage, and I ignore any
error from the MNIR model. For this reason, we might expect standard errors
to be biased downward in the later analysis.
The sentiment score si is the main covariate used in my analysis. Of the
6,013 score loadings I extract from the multinomial model, about 34% of them
have non-zero estimates for their values. This is in part due to my choice
of a strict lasso penalty, rather than a semi-concave one, but in addition due
to the limited variation in the review rating variable. The vast majority of
reviews are 5/5 stars. Nonetheless, there is substantial variation in the score
sentiment variables I construct from the text using the MNIR model. Only
7% of reviews I consider have sentiment scores of zero, which would be the
case when a review text is “uninformative” in regard to customer sentiment (as
measured by not having any words with nonzero score magnitudes). Figure 4
shows a boxplot of sentiment by the star rating of the review. While there is
a clear monotonic relationship by number of stars given, there is substantial
variation in sentiment within each star rating as well. In particular, we see that
the most variation occurs in the 5-star category, as might be expected since it
is by far the most populated. The range of the upper and lower hinges of the
5-star boxplot demonstrate that within 5-star reviews, there is enough variation
in text sentiment to cover virtually the entire support of observed sentiment
in 1-4 star reviews. This suggests that there is in fact a non-trivial amount of
5-star reviewers whose text aligns more with the language used in low rating
reviews.
4.2 Projecting the MNIR model onto Forum Data
In addition to analyzing customer review text, I analyze the text of posts in each
forum thread on the Agora forums. I now describe the process through which I
analyze forum text as a complement to review text. The unit of measurement
for analyzing forum text are forum posts which are classified as “mentions” that
satisfy one of two requirements. The first is that the text in a post specifically
includes a vendor’s username in it’s body. This is a direct mention. The second
is if the post is located within a forum thread of which either:
1. The title of the forum thread contains the vendor’s username.
2one could imagine training a MNIR regression model separately or reviews in each sub-
category, but this approach would be limited when comparing to the forum data
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2. The first post in the thread (the post by the originator of the thread)
contains the vendor’s username.
The idea behind this latter identification strategy is that if a forum’s title or first
post has a vendor username, I assume the topic of the thread is the mentioned
vendor, and specifically the vendor’s quality. If a post mentions multiple vendors
in the same body of text, for my main analysis, I drop the post, since it is im-
possible for me to evaluate within a forum post which positive or negative words
are directed at which vendor. Later, as a robustness check, I rerun my baseline
analysis by counting mentions of multiple vendors in a single post as separate
but identical “reviews” of each individual vendor’s quality. In practice this does
not happen often. In order to reduce the noise I might introduce by including
mentions that are not actually discussing with the quality of the vendor, I limit
my analysis to forum posts within 4 sub-forums: General Discussion, Vendor
Discussion, Product Offers, and Product Categories. The other sub-forums I
exclude are: Referral Links, Newbie Section, Generic Randomness, German,
Security discussion, Bugs, Philosophy, New features, and News. If forum posts
are correctly categorized, it is unlikely that any of these excluded subforums
would contain a vendor mention about the vendor’s quality in relation to their
products or customer service. Additionally, I exclude any vendor whose name is
an English word, according to the Natural Language Toolkit’s corpus of English
words. I do this because it will be impossible to distinguish mentions that refer
to the actual vendor in question or happen to just be using the English word the
vendor is associated with. In my later analysis, to be consistent, I also throw
out all reviews and product listings by vendors whose name is an English word
as well, since these vendors may be discussed on the forums but my mention
identification strategy would fail to identify them. About 5% of the vendors
in my data (the set of users who listed a product at least once in the listings
dataset in 2014) have an English word as a name. I also remove one specific
user, whose name is “ebay”, who had posts associated with them in the forums
that were actually discussing counterfeiting methods on the popular auction
website eBay. Finally, I remove from my sample all posts by a vendor where
they self-advertise (since consumers will presumably discount this information
given the source). This constitutes a very small portion of all observed posts.
Using this definition of vendor mentions, I identify 61,679 unique posts that
mention a vendor. Of these, 17,234, or 28%, are a direct mention, and rest are
posts in forum threads whose subject line includes a vendor. Some examples
of the titles of these forum threads are “californiadreamin vendor. legitimate
or not? feedback?”, “beware goingpostal, they are scammers!!!!” and “current
whitelist of opiate vendors (updated on the regular)”.
Like all choices, my choice of how to identify vendor mentions in the Agora
forums is somewhat arbitrary and has its limitations. I cannot rule out that some
threads might veer off-topic and discuss an entirely new subject, unrelated to the
vendor’s quality. Inversely, there may be some posts that are in fact reviewing
a vendor’s quality, but fail to name the vendor in their text body (perhaps a
reply to a direct mention of a vendor). Additionally, there will be some posts
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I do not capture simply because a particular thread was never scraped during
the data collection process.
A primary interest of this paper is to compare the relative impact of formal
and informal sentiment on vendor quality. I take all 61,679 posts flagged as
mentioning a specific vendor on the Agora forums, and convert the text to a
vendor sentiment variable, analogously to how I did in the review text setting.
However, in this setting I have no labeled dependent variables; there is not an
associated numerical rating of a vendor with each forum mention. So, I treat
these forum posts as coming from the same population as the customer reviews,
and apply the MNIR model previously estimated on customer reviews to the
forum posts. Specifically, I preprocess all post text as I did with reviews, treat
each individual post as a unit of observation, and apply the score loadings φ I
estimated with the labeled review data to the sequence of words wp contained
in each post, generating a vendor sentiment score for each forum post, fsp. To
my surprise, there is a smaller fraction of forum posts that are “uninformative”
(i.e. fsp = 0); 3% of the forum posts are uninformative, while about 7% of
formal reviews are uninformative. One can imagine that, even though posts
mention a specific vendor, and are in one of the 4 appropriate subforums, some
of these flagged posted are discussing an aspect of the vendor that is unrelated to
consumer sentiment. There is a substantial amount of variation in the sentiment
in forums as well. Figure 5 shows the density function of informative (non-
zero) customer sentiment scores in both the set of forum posts and customer
reviews. The density function that includes all consumer sentiment is similar in
appearance but with a large spike at zero, which makes the plot more difficult
to interpret due to the scaling. The distributions of forum and review sentiment
appear comparable in shape, but the distribution of forum sentiment is clearly
shifted to the left of review sentiment. An interpretation of this is that sentiment
on the forums is more negative towards vendors than on the formal reviews. This
suggests that the forums may serve as an unrestricted setting where users can
communicate their actual opinion on vendors more freely without the threat of
blackmail that might accompany a very negative product review. Or it may
be that the set of users who post on forums and those who actually purchase
products simply differ in their attitudes or beliefs towards vendors.
Having generated scores {si} and {sp} for reviews and forum posts, respec-
tively, I (separately) standardize the non-zero scores in each setting to have
mean 0 and standard deviation 13. Doing so eases the interpretation of coef-
ficient estimates for later analysis, so that a 1 standard deviation increase in
(informative) sentiment will result in an additive β or multiplicative eβ increase
in the dependent variable I consider, depending on whether I use a linear or ex-
ponential mean model. For each vendor, I then construct an aggregate average
3I specifically excluded the zero-score text from the mean and standard deviation calcula-
tions because standardizing these reviews would cause them to take on a non-zero value, which
is difficult to interpret since I know these scores are zero because they have no informative
text in their messages. note that overall forum and review sentiment variables will still have
mean 0 after this transformation, but a lower standard deviation than 1
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vendor sentiment variable for the history of reviews of vendor v up until week t:
s˜v,t =
Σnvi=1si,v1{t(i,v)<t}
Σnvi=11{t(i,v)<t}
where t(i, v) maps a review by consumer i on a product sold by vendor v to
the week it was posted. Analogously, I construct for each vendor an average
sentiment variable from forum mentions; that is, the mean of forum vendor
sentiment scores fsp,v until week t:
f˜ sv,t =
Σmvp=1fsp,v1{t(p,v)<t}
Σmvp=11{t(p,v)<t}
where mv is the total number of forum mentions of a vendor in the sample pe-
riod. Additionally, I construct total counts of the number of vendor’s product
reviews / vendor mentions up until time t in the same manner (denoted n˜v,t
and m˜v,t, respectively). I choose to construct review sentiment variable’s at the
vendor level (rather than at the item level) so that average vendor sentiment
between the two settings (reviews and forums) can be more directly compara-
ble. Since discussion on forums mostly concerns vendors, rather than the spe-
cific items they sell, identifying specific mentions of products would have been
challenging and probably yielded significantly less forum posts to work with.
Because some vendors may not have a history of reviews or forum mentions at
any given point in time, I always include a missing dummy when including these
variables in a regression analysis.
Tables 3 and 4 contain regression output from regressing (standardized)
sentiment in each setting on virtually all observables available. We see, in the
review setting, that after adding product reviewed and review week fixed ef-
fects, there is monotonically increasing relationship between sentiment scores
and stars given in the review (as should be the case). In addition, other in-
teresting relationships include that buyers with a longer transaction history
are overall more positive in their review sentiment. Also, the buyer’s personal
rating (vendors may voluntarily review buyers who buy from them) does not
display a clear relationship, except that those without a perfect 5-star rating
give more negative text feedback. As may be expected, reviews on no finalize
early products are more positive than those that ask customers to finalize early
(this effect is estimated from listings that within their listing time switch from
no finalize early to finalize early, or vice versa). In regards to forum sentiment,
we see that experienced forum members are less likely to be positive in their
sentiment. This descriptive result is suggestive of experienced vendors being
sophisticated in how they share information with the community: they may
know to be “good” to vendors in their product reviews, yet on forums, they
are less worried about how a vendor might punish their negative report, and
can speak more openly. We find no correlation, after controlling for a variety of
fixed effects (username of the poster, vendor they are mentioning, and week the
post is published), of karma, a social media similar in spirit to Facebook likes,
relating to how positive or negative forum post sentiment is.
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I also include in these tables one model regressing number of words in a
review or mention on observables. We see that non-5 star reviews on average
have 3 more words, which may be expected since a review < 5 stars represents
a deviation from the default and so may indicate more thought is being given to
these reviews. We also see some evidence of review fatigue: more experienced
customers have, on average, less words in their reviews than newer buyers on
the market.
4.3 Item Listing Text
A characteristic of a product listing that does not cleanly enter a regression
equation is the listing text description of the product, along with the title of the
listing. It is easy to see that changes in the description can in fact cause changes
in sales: perhaps by editing the text to be less misleading about the product’s
quality, or making the title more engaging to consumers scrolling through a list
of products when searching the Darknet. Unlike the previous section, where I
was able to compare reviews against each other because of associated ratings,
there are no labels on the listing text, so I cannot say which listings texts rep-
resent effective or ineffective advertisement of the product. Thus, I need an
alternative methodology to MNIR in order to be able to successfully control
for changes in listing text over the lifespan of a given product. As before, I
preprocess the text of listings and then transform the title and description text
(separately) into word frequency matrices for all of the sample listings. If all the
information in the text relevant to consumers is in these word frequency ma-
trices, then I could simply include the word matrices as additional controls in
my regression to capture possible changes in sales due to changes in the phras-
ing of the listing. However, due to the massive size of these word frequency
matrices, (14,000 unique word stems in titles, and 71,000 unique word stems
in descriptions), this is computationally infeasible. To circumvent this, I de-
compose the word frequency matrices into principal components (PCs) that can
explain a large portion of the variation in the listing text data. By using the
lower-dimensional principal components as controls, I can approximately con-
trol for the word frequencies. Due the size and sparsity of these word frequency
matrices, I use truncated singular value decomposition (TSVD) to retrieve the
initial PCs of each listing text description. Furthermore, I do this principal com-
ponent decomposition on the “joint” title-description matrix that is obtained by
merging the title and description word frequency matrices along observations,
so that all rows now sum to 2, and each contain the frequencies of words within
titles and descriptions separately. The motivation for this is that, rather than
extracting, for example, the first 100 PCs of text and description separately,
then including the 200 PCs in my regression specification as controls, there are
likely to be strong correlations between words present in the title and words
present in the item description. So doing a PC decomposition on the joint ma-
trix will require fewer PCs to explain the same amount of variation in the data. I
chose to not just lump the title word counts into the counts of description words
since, on average, description text is much longer than the title text, so the title
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text would contribute much less to the estimated principal components. the
joint matrix approach I use more equitably weights the principle components
explaining variation in the title and description listing text.
5 Estimation
This paper limits its inference to the effects of our covariates of interest on ex-
pected product demand, which the Poisson distribution is found to be asymp-
totically robust to. This is the case even if the true underlying demand function
differs from Poisson, as long as the true mean function shares the exponential
mean functional form [2]. An alternative interpretation is that the true under-
lying model of product demand has covariates that are multiplicative factors of
product demand (as opposed to additive, as is necessary in the linear regression
model). This is a fairly general assumption in this setting, and if satisfied, we
can consistently estimate the multiplicative parameters eβ and their standard
errors, robust to misspecification. Given our large sample size (about 600,000
observations of weekly sales data at the item level), I am not too concerned with
our estimates deviating greatly from their asymptotic counterparts.
A simple histogram of sales per week by item listing (Figure 2) clearly indi-
cates that sales of individual products per week are exponentially distributed,
as might be expected. In fact, when we compare the empirical distribution of
observed sales against a Poisson distribution with mean parameter λ equal to
the sample mean of weekly item sales, we see that the Poisson distribution, even
on the unconditional empirical distribution, appears to be a fairly good approxi-
mation. One notable feature of the data is that while it appears similar in shape
to a Poisson distribution with the same mean, it also appears overdispersed, as
is evident from the additional mass on the 0 and ≥ 7 sales bins. Indeed, the
sample variance is about 4 times as large as the sample mean (1.21 versus 0.28).
Given information on sales, sentiment, and other product/vendor character-
istics, I estimate the relationship between my covariates of interest and product
demand via Poisson regression. Based on the unconditional distribution of sales,
modeling weekly product sales as Poisson appears to be a reasonably good ap-
proximation. In addition to this, I prefer Poisson regression (as opposed to other
count data regression models) due to its closed form solution to incorporating
fixed effects, which allows me to non-parametrically control for unobservable
time-invariant product characteristics. My regression model for the baseline
specification is the follows:
log(E[yj,t|X]) = β1s˜v,t + β2f˜ sv,t
+ α1 log(n˜v,t) + α21{n˜v,t = 0}+ α3 log(m˜v,t) + α41{m˜v,t = 0}
+ γ1Xv,t + γ2Xv,t + +µj + δt
where Xv,t indicates a matrix of vendor controls, Xv,t indicates a matrix of
product controls, δt and µj are product and time fixed effects, respectively.
I include a variety of controls to remove all supply-side variation available to
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consumers from the sales data when estimating my model of relating vendor
sentiment to product demand. As I have stated before, by including variables
for all decisions made by the vendor that are observable to the consumer, I
can ensure that a change by the vendor to, for example, flag the listing as no
finalize early, is not confounded with the measured effect of vendor sentiment
on demand. These include:
• Vendor Controls: the average vendor rating, a missing vendor rating in-
dicator,and indicators for the past volume category the vendor selling the
product is in. For example, in Figure 1, the vendor’s volume category is
“6∼10 deals” and their rating is 5/5.
• Item Controls: This includes an indicator for the listing being flagged as
no finalize early, the natural log of the price of the item, the average item
rating based on all reviews of that particular item, an indicator for zero
item-specific reviews, and an indicator for the product category (absorbed
by item fixed effects, but present when the regression is estimated with
random effects). In addition, I control for the item description of the listing
and the text title with the first 100 principal components of the joint word
frequency matrix, which explain 1/3 of the variation in the item listing
text data. As a robustness check, I re-ran my baseline specification with
300 PCs, explaining 1/2 of the variation, and found results to be nearly
identical in my covariates of interest.4
By also including time fixed effects (so indicators for each unique week in the
dataset), I am able to implicitly control for any changes in aggregate market
conditions, such as the stability of the TOR network, the Bitcoin exchange
rate, and seasonal changes in sales (on both the demand and supply side).
Through controlling all of these alternative channels that may effect sales, I
can then cautiously interpret coefficients from regressing sales of a listing on
vendor sentiment as responses in demand (since responses in supply that effect
a consumer’s choice are already conditioned on).
6 Results
6.1 Baseline Specification
I now introduce the main regression results of the paper. Table 5 displays
estimates from a Poisson panel regression of sales on vendor sentiment in both
the forum and customer review setting, along with the (logged) # of reviews
& mentions. The panel regression is done with respect to each product listing
(so it includes product fixed effects), along with cluster-robust standard errors
at the item level to allow for arbitrary correlations across observations of an
individual listing. I iteratively add more controls column-by-column to show
the persistence of the relationships that are estimated. The main specification
4Results of these regressions are available by request.
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of interest is column (5), where I control for all relevant supply responses, in
addition to time fixed effects, so that the coefficients may be interpreted as
demand responses to sentiment (i.e. elasticities).
The table shows multiplicative effects of a 1 unit increase in each regressor.
Both measures of sentiment are averages of individual reviews/post sentiment
that are normalized to have standard deviation 1 and mean 0 (among non-zero
scores). The interpretation of the coefficient of, for example, Avg. Vendor
Review Sentiment, is that an increase (decrease) in vendor sentiment among all
reviews by 1 standard deviation leads to an 8.75% increase (8.05% decrease)
in quantity demanded for the offered product. I find in the baseline regression
that vendor sentiment on forums and reviews are approximately equal in their
influence on demand- an average increase in 1 standard deviation of forum posts
mentioning vendors leads to a 10.7% increase in sales, which is not statistically
significantly different from the impact of average vendor sentiment in reviews.
Additionally, both have the expected sign - more positive vendor sentiment
leads to higher demand. This verifies the hypothesis I had entering this paper-
forum-based vendor sentiment has a substantial impact on consumer demand,
and consumers in fact appear to value this information at least as highly as the
information they glean from the text present in product reviews of a vendor.
This is somewhat surprising, given the potential for mischaracterizations or lies
in mentions on forums, and my somewhat crude method for identifying relevant
forum posts. This underscores the potential importance of a designated space
for Darknet market participants to freely exchange information on vendors.
Besides the sentiment measures, other variables for the most part have the
expected sign: average item rating (on a 0-5 scale) is very positively associated
with increased demand, price has a negative multiplicative (insignificant) effect
on sales, and flagging one’s post as no finalize early has a positive effect. Note
that we cannot interpret the coefficient on price and no finalize early as effects
on demand, since the response in sales to these changes could be endogenously
driven by the vendor’s decision to change the price / flag (i.e. low sales lead
them to lower the price). Vendor rating, somewhat surprisingly, is insignificant
when we include all of our additional controls. This may reflect the fact that the
vendor review sentiment variable is a “sufficient statistic” for the vendor’s aver-
age rating, and so its inclusion in the regression makes the vendor rating variable
irrelevant. Conditional on scores si , the review ratings ri should be orthogonal
to the words contained in the review text. A more positive interpretation of
this finding is that the star ratings in reviews across a vendor’s products are
informative insofar as they reflect the information contained within the text;
no additional demand-relevant information is present in the numerical rating.
This cannot be completely true however, given the strongly positive associa-
tion between sales and the product-specific average rating. However. it may be
the case that information on vendor-wide attributes (such as communication,
customer service) is transmitted exclusively through review text, while product
attributes (such as quality of the good) may not be completely conveyed in the
review text. The negative relation of total count on past reviews with future
sales is simply capturing the limited stock of vendors. Since past reviews exactly
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coincide with past sales, vendors with a fixed supply will mechanically have to
sell less as past sales accumulate.
6.2 Differential Effects
Having established the importance of overall average vendor sentiment on prod-
uct demand, I now look to uncover some heterogeneous effects of vendor sen-
timent on product demand. Specifically, I test the hypotheses I proposed in
section 2. These hypotheses are formally tested in Table 6, where I control for
all the supply variation I considered in column (5) in Table 5.
• Hypothesis 1: This is tested in column (1) of Table 6. I test this by inter-
acting average review/forum vendor sentiment with logged # of reviews/-
posts. The coefficient on (uninteracted) average review/forum sentiment
is now completely insignificant, while the interaction term is highly signif-
icant for both. This aligns nicely with a Bayesian framework of consumers
updating their perceptions of vendors based on a stream of incoming re-
views: consumers move their prior more (change their demand) when the
observed sentiment in reviews/forums is associated with a higher sample
size.
• Hypothesis 2: This is tested in column (2) of Table 6. I take all reviews,
and split them into two groups: those by buyers who have bought at least
10 times on Agora, and those who have bought less (buyer past volume is
observed on every review). This corresponds to an approximately median
split of the sample of reviews in my dataset. Similarly, for forum posts,
I split them into posts by forum members by “ranking”, a title given to
active/inactive users. My split is approximately based on whether or not
a user has ≥ 200 posts5, where those with ≥ 200 posts classified as ex-
perienced members (this is about 25% of the sample, no cut closer to
the median is available). Examining the regression results, I find that, to
my surprise and contrary to my initial hypothesis, it appears that vendor
sentiment in reviews from inexperienced buyers is more influential on con-
sumer demand (relative to experienced buyers). On the other hand, there
is no observed heterogeneity based on my classification of experience in
the forum setting. The “P-value” fields at the bottom of column (2) of
the table shows the p-values from tests of equality of the coefficients on
average sentiment between experienced and inexperienced users, done sep-
arately for both the review and forum setting. The non-differential effect
of experience in forums appears to be a consequence of the way I measure
experience (# of past posts). This may not be particularly informative of
a forum member’s quality. The result that inexperienced members com-
municate vendor sentiment that is more influential on product demand
is a curious one when taken at face value. However, there is a possi-
ble explanation. Directing our attention back to column (4) of table 3,
5See here for an official discussion of the rankings system by the same administrator of the
Agora forums.
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we see some evidence that experienced and inexperienced buyers are giv-
ing different types of reviews, and this might be the driver of the result.
Namely, less experienced buyers are, on average, inputting more words
into each of their reviews, and their reviews are overall less positive than
their more experienced counterparts. It may then be the case that inexpe-
rienced buyers are, perhaps naively, submitting more thoughtful reviews
that are in fact more informative, while their experienced counterparts are
foregoing the additional cost of giving an informative, possibly negative
review that might agitate the vendor. It is worth reiterating that this
argument is based on indirect evidence, and without explicitly controlling
for each individual review’s characteristics (which is difficult when we are
aggregating reviews into an item panel framework), it cannot be verified.
• Hypothesis 3: This is tested in column (3) of Table 6. As before, I
test whether the coefficient of average sentiment on finalize early versus
no finalize early listings are equal, and display the p-value in the cells
below. In both the forum and review settings, I find evidence that those
listings that allow finalize early are impacted about twice as much by ven-
dor sentiment communicated in reviews and forum posts. Although the
coefficient on the interaction of finalize early and review sentiment is not
significantly different from its no finalize early counterpart (p-value = 0.2),
it is significantly different from zero. This confirms the hypothesis that
those potential customers of products with a commitment to not finalize
early will be able to take what the vendor reports in the listing description
more at “face-value”. It is particularly noteworthy that, despite the un-
interacted no finalize early indicator entering positively and significantly
in the previous table, its interaction yields results pointing to less impor-
tance when analyzing the vendor sentiment available to customers (i.e. I
am not capturing the fact that those vendors with no finalize early listings
are more positively reviewed than those with finalize early listings).
• Hypothesis 4: This is tested in column (4) of Table 6. For each listing, I
isolate the set of reviews for that product, and compare the impact of the
average review sentiment these reviews have to the average sentiment for
all other reviews given of a vendor up until time t. To my surprise, I find
that the average of “other” product reviews is 5 times as influential on
customer demand (2% increase versus 10% increase)! However, this has
an explanation besides product demand being more influenced by reviews
for other products. Since a vendor is likely to list multiple products, there
are, on average, many more reviews for a vendor’s other products than
any individual listing. As a result, when one controls for the additional
information from sample size conveyed in average other product sentiment
by interacting with logged # of reviews (analogous to the procedure done
in column (1), but this time separately for product reviews and other
product reviews), the two produce similar coefficients that are not statis-
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tically significantly different from each other6. This column, then, serves
to reaffirm Hypothesis 1, that consumers value the signal sent by average
customer sentiment more when it is accompanied by a larger sample of
reviews, when formulating their posterior on vendor quality.
Overall, the largest takeaway from these differential effects is that consumer
demand is significantly more influenced by vendor sentiment on the web when
one increases the sample from which this average comes from. In this sense, there
are definitely “increasing scales” to positive vendor sentiment if it continues to
be perpetrated by more and more customers.
6.3 Vendor Response on the Extensive Margin
While I have shown that within the lifespan of a product listing, vendor changes
in product characteristics can be appropriately controlled for, there may be
other forms of response by the vendor. Namely, it may be the case that a
vendor responds by pulling a listing altogether from the marketplace due to
poor sentiment , and this may be distorting my interpretations of coefficients on
vendor sentiment as demand responses. To investigate this potential confounder,
I regress the total number of listings produced by each vendor on the sentiment
variables discussed before, while controlling for vendor attributes. If it is found
that vendors are not responsive to customer sentiment in text on the extensive
margin, then it is unlikely this will be a significant confounder. Because I am
now interested in evaluating weekly number of total listings, I can draw upon
the GRAMS dataset in addition to the Agora scrapes. The GRAMS data will
contain the uncensored count of listings for each vendor on Agora, so it should
produce the more precise estimate of the true relation between vendor sentiment
and number of posted listings on the Darknet.
Table 7 shows the regression output of a Poisson regression of listings count
on sentiment variables. I include a version of both fixed and random gamma
vendor effects, and I draw my dependent variable from both the GRAMS and
Agora HTML datasets. As is evident, there is no statistically significant vendor
response in the number of listings by a vendor to text sentiment. Across the
board, the regression using GRAMS data show zero effect of sentiment in both
forums and reviews on a vendor’s number of listings. And while the coefficient
on vendor review sentiment on the Agora scrapes is significant at the 10% level,
it in fact moves in the opposite direction one expects. The interpretation of
the coefficient is that if positive sentiment about a vendor in reviews increases,
they actually offer less products, rather than more. Given this counterintuitive
coefficient, along with the estimated effect of zero everywhere else, and the noisy
nature of the Agora data (since product counts may be incorrectly underesti-
mated due to the web crawl timing out), I discount this finding as an outlier
not reflective of the true relationship.
6Regression results of this interaction are available upon request
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6.4 Robustness Checks
Here, I discuss some validity checks performed to confirm my results are not
knife’s edge in nature and survive a broad set of specifications. To begin, Tables
A1 & A2 are the same specification as 5 & 6, discussed above, but this time es-
timated with random gamma-distributed effects instead of non-parametric fixed
effects. We see that in this specification, qualitatively results are identical, and
the multiplicative effects are on average slightly greater in magnitude. Noth-
ing else substantially changes. In addition, we see that the α parameter of the
regression, the multiplier for the variance of the conditional Poisson distribu-
tion, is significant and positive. In fact, this specification (Poisson with gamma
random effects) is equivalent to a negative binomial regression, which allows for
overdispersion in the count data, and so leads to more efficient estimation when
overdispersion is present [2]. These tables demonstrate that the main results
of the paper are not a function of the Poisson regression assumption that the
mean and variance of the conditional distribution are equal.
I also include a version of the regressions present in Tables 5 & 6 estimated
via linear regression (maintaining product fixed effects), in Tables A4 & A5.
While a linearly additive model for non-negative count data is questionable,
these regressions also yield coefficients that are qualitatively similar to those
estimated in the tables discussed above. They provide evidence that the esti-
mates I find are not a result of the maximum-likelihood estimation procedure
getting stuck in a local mode due to the high dimensionality of the coefficient
parameter β (I have about 180 different regressors, excluding fixed effects, in
my main specification) since OLS yields a closed form solution for the global
optimum.
Finally, in Table A3, I estimate my main specification using the non-exclusive
measure of forum mentions. Instead of limiting mentions to those that include
only one specific vendor, I assign the posts that mention multiple vendors to
each individual vendor as duplicates. The estimated effect is lower under this
classification, possibly due to increased measurement error, but nonetheless sig-
nificant at the 5% level.
7 Conclusion
I present evidence in this paper that communication between marketplace par-
ticipants - as captured by sentiment variables on vendor quality- is an important
influence of demand for products. While that result is not particularly ground-
breaking, I find that consumer demand is equally influenced by communication
on both formal and informal networks - namely, product reviews versus commu-
nity forums. This may come as a surprise since well-regulated product reviews
should be more reliable, but the evidence presented here suggests that discussion
even in unstructured settings like forums should be an important determinant
of product demand. In addition, I find some empirical evidence that a vendor’s
ability to commit to disclosure, by flagging their listings as no finalize early,
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dampens the effect of communication on demand. Furthermore, I find strong
evidence that product demand is more responsive to customer communication
as the number of messages grows, as may be expected in a Bayesian updating
framework.
There are some limitations to interpreting these results, however. Since
my dataset is based on imperfect web crawls of the Darknet, I cannot perfectly
observe when a change in product characteristics occurs. While this missingness
in random, it may be the case that I am not perfectly controlling supply side
variation, and so cannot completely attribute the effect of sentiment on sales
to demand. By aggregating to the weekly level, I attempt to minimize the
influence of this, but also introduce new errors: namely, that some customers
who bought during a week may have been exposed to a different listing page,
depending on when they purchased and when a vendor updated their product
page. This paper looks only at the effects on the Agora marketplace, but Agora
is functioning alongside other Darknet markets, and their may be important
cross-marketplace effects this paper does not explore. Additionally, I excluded
from my analysis controlling for variation in the image shown on the product
listing page. State-of-the-art machine learning algorithms exist to control for the
information contained in an image, but these ultimately proved too cumbersome
at this stage to include in this project.
Ultimately, this paper serves as a useful starting point for the study of a
market that is exceptional for testing economic theory, due to its highly anony-
mous nature and independence from real-world regulations, but more work on
the economic properties of Darknet markets should follow.
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Figure 1: A Typical Agora Market Listing
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Figure 2: Distribution of Sales
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Figure 3: Volume of the major marketplaces on the Darknet
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Figure 4: Sentiment Scores by Review Rating
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Figure 5: Distribution of Informative Sentiment in Reviews and Forum Posts
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Weekly Item Panel Dataset
Variable (1)
Number of Sales/Week per Item 0.28
(1.11)
Item Rating (0-5 Stars) 4.86
(0.57)
Price (BTC) 3.64
(925.79)
# of Customer Reviews per Item 3.50
(11.09)
# of Customer Reviews per Vendor 123.74
(247.64)
Vendor Rating (0-5 Stars) 4.87
(0.43)
Average Stdized Vendor Sentiment From Customer Reviews -0.09
(0.39)
# of Mentions per Vendor on Forums 37.43
(199.63)
Average Stdized Vendor Sentiment From Forum Posts 0.03
(0.52)
% of Items with Finalize Early 56.68%
% Missing Item Rating (Zero Item Reviews) 59.87%
% Missing Vendor Rating (Zero Vendor Reviews) 5.75%
% Missing Vendor Forum Sentiment (Zero Mentions) 27.17%
Number of Items in Sample 50012
Number of Vendors in Sample 2084
Number of Weeks in Sample 54
Number of Unique Agora Market Scrapes in Sample 109
Number of Observations 651143
Means of variables reported in cells. Standard deviations in parentheses for
continuous variables. Sample means and standard deviations calculated at the
Item-by-Week observation level, as in the constructed panel dataset used for
the final analysis.
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Table 3: Correlates of Review Sentiment
Dependent Variable: Standardized Sentiment Number of Words
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Words -0.058*** -0.059*** -0.059***
(0.00045) (0.00061) (0.00060)
0 Star Item Rating -1.89*** -1.66*** -1.65*** 1.99***
(0.016) (0.020) (0.020) (0.11)
1 Star Item Rating -1.52*** -1.32*** -1.32*** 2.74***
(0.025) (0.031) (0.031) (0.21)
2 Star Item Rating -1.32*** -1.16*** -1.16*** 2.94***
(0.025) (0.029) (0.029) (0.22)
3 Star Item Rating -1.09*** -0.94*** -0.94*** 2.47***
(0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.14)
4 Star Item Rating -0.72*** -0.61*** -0.61*** 2.64***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.11)
Buyer Has 1-5 Previous Deals 0.0072 0.024* -0.0024 -0.27***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.075)
Buyer Has 6-10 Previous Deals 0.066*** 0.078*** 0.047*** -0.44***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.082)
Buyer Has 11-25 Previous Deals 0.090*** 0.099*** 0.066*** -0.52***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.086)
Buyer Has >25 Previous Deals 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.11*** -0.55***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.090)
Missing Buyer Rating -0.11*** -0.074*** -0.079*** -0.33***
(0.0062) (0.0072) (0.0074) (0.038)
Buyer Rating < 3 Stars -0.089*** -0.070*** -0.079*** -0.27***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.071)
Buyer Rating ∈ [3, 4) -0.14*** -0.094*** -0.096*** -0.079
(0.027) (0.031) (0.031) (0.15)
Buyer Rating ∈ [4, 5) -0.066*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.11*
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.057)
No Finalize Early 0.080*** 0.076*** 0.074*** 0.020
(0.0046) (0.020) (0.020) (0.094)
Constant 0.33*** 0.31*** -0.21 5.78***
(0.013) (0.021) (0.19) (0.89)
Observations 197040 197040 197040 197040
R-Squared 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.01
Fixed Effects None Item FE Item+Time FE Item+Time FE
Mean of Dependent Variable -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 6.58
SD of Dependent Variable 0.96 0.96 0.96 4.39
OLS estimates reported from regressing sentiment and number of words of a
review on observables. Informative sentiment is standardized to have mean 0
and standard deviation 1. Robust standard errors reported in parantheses in
column (1), and listing clustered standard errors reported in parantheses in
columns (2) to (4). *,**,*** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels,
respectively.
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Table 4: Correlates of Forum Sentiment
Dependent Variable: Standardized Sentiment Number of Words
(1) (2) (3)
Number of Words -0.00033*** -0.00051***
(0.000043) (0.000081)
New Forum Member 0.033*** 0.059** -1.77
(0.012) (0.023) (1.45)
Experienced Forum Member 0.038*** -0.033* 1.43
(0.012) (0.020) (1.46)
Agora Vendor -0.063*** 0.26*** -2.16
(0.017) (0.097) (5.40)
First Post in Thread -0.10*** -0.057*** 38.8***
(0.017) (0.021) (2.97)
Positive Karma 0.0011*** 0.00036 0.084
(0.00012) (0.00028) (0.068)
Negative Karma -0.0025*** -0.00045 -0.063
(0.00021) (0.00038) (0.065)
Missing Karma Data -0.070* 0.033 -6.99**
(0.040) (0.051) (2.78)
Product Categories Subforum 0.20*** 0.13*** 12.6***
(0.013) (0.030) (2.49)
Product Offers Subforum 0.23*** 0.062*** -6.83***
(0.016) (0.023) (1.54)
Vendor Discussion Subforum 0.11*** 0.065*** 5.16***
(0.011) (0.017) (1.02)
Constant -0.10 0.15 -0.94
(0.089) (0.23) (6.63)
Observations 61660 61660 61660
R-Squared 0.01 0.07 0.08
Fixed Effects Time Time+Author+Vendor Time+Author+Vendor
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.00 0.00 41.56
SD of Dependent Variable 0.98 0.98 68.45
Standard errors in parentheses
* p¡0.10, ** p¡0.05, *** p¡0.01
OLS estimates reported from regressing sentiment and number of words of a
post on observables. Informative sentiment is standardized to have mean 0
and standard deviation 1. Robust standard errors reported in parantheses in
column (1), and author clustered standard errors reported in parantheses in
columns (2) to (3). *,**,*** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels,
respectively.
34
T
a
b
le
5
:
Im
p
ac
t
o
f
C
o
n
su
m
er
T
ex
t
S
en
ti
m
en
t
o
n
P
ro
d
u
ct
D
em
a
n
d
D
ep
en
d
en
t
V
ar
ia
b
le
:
N
u
m
b
er
of
S
a
le
s
p
er
W
ee
k
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
A
ve
ra
ge
It
em
R
at
in
g
1
.6
1
7
0
*
*
*
1
.6
1
7
9
*
*
*
1
.6
0
4
5
*
*
*
1
.5
9
4
2
*
*
*
1
.5
5
4
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
7
9
5
)
(0
.0
7
9
9
)
(0
.0
7
8
9
)
(0
.0
7
3
6
)
(0
.0
6
7
1
)
A
v
g.
V
en
d
or
R
ev
ie
w
S
en
ti
m
en
t
1
.2
3
5
3
*
*
*
1
.2
3
1
7
*
*
*
1
.2
1
0
7
*
*
*
1
.0
4
3
0
1
.0
8
7
5
*
*
*
(0
.0
4
1
0
)
(0
.0
4
0
4
)
(0
.0
3
8
1
)
(0
.0
3
4
3
)
(0
.0
3
5
1
)
lo
g(
N
u
m
b
er
of
V
en
d
or
R
ev
ie
w
s)
1
.0
8
1
7
*
*
*
1
.0
3
9
5
*
*
*
1
.0
2
8
3
*
*
0
.7
6
9
5
*
*
*
0
.8
4
4
7
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
9
5
)
(0
.0
1
1
2
)
(0
.0
1
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
8
4
)
(0
.0
1
0
4
)
A
v
g.
V
en
d
or
F
or
u
m
S
en
ti
m
en
t
1
.1
2
5
4
*
*
*
1
.1
1
9
1
*
*
*
1
.1
0
6
7
*
*
*
1
.1
0
7
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
3
2
7
)
(0
.0
3
2
3
)
(0
.0
3
1
7
)
(0
.0
3
0
8
)
lo
g(
N
u
m
b
er
of
F
or
u
m
M
en
ti
on
s)
1
.1
0
0
1
*
*
*
1
.0
7
7
9
*
*
*
0
.9
7
8
0
0
.9
9
9
3
(0
.0
1
9
7
)
(0
.0
2
0
1
)
(0
.0
1
8
7
)
(0
.0
1
9
6
)
lo
g(
P
ri
ce
)
(B
T
C
)
1
.0
7
9
0
*
*
*
1
.0
0
1
0
0
.9
9
4
2
(0
.0
2
3
0
)
(0
.0
1
4
2
)
(0
.0
1
4
8
)
1
{N
o
F
in
al
iz
e
E
ar
ly
on
P
ro
d
u
ct
}
1
.4
9
2
3
*
*
*
1.
3
0
8
1
*
*
*
1
.2
7
3
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
6
3
7
)
(0
.0
5
4
9
)
(0
.0
5
5
2
)
V
en
d
or
R
at
in
g
1
.0
2
2
7
0
.9
8
9
9
(0
.0
5
4
4
)
(0
.0
4
9
4
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
3
2
8
8
3
8
3
2
8
8
3
8
3
2
8
6
5
9
3
2
8
6
5
9
3
2
8
6
5
9
L
og
-l
ik
el
ih
o
o
d
-2
3
4
1
9
3
.7
-2
3
4
0
2
4
.8
-2
3
2
7
9
5
.2
-2
2
0
7
2
4
.9
-2
0
8
6
6
3
.6
It
em
C
on
tr
ol
s
F
a
ls
e
F
a
ls
e
T
ru
e
T
ru
e
T
ru
e
V
en
d
or
C
on
tr
ol
s
F
a
ls
e
F
a
ls
e
F
a
ls
e
T
ru
e
T
ru
e
T
im
e
F
E
F
a
ls
e
F
a
ls
e
F
a
ls
e
F
a
ls
e
T
ru
e
E
st
im
at
es
re
p
or
te
d
fr
om
a
P
oi
ss
on
re
gr
es
si
on
w
it
h
p
ro
d
u
ct
li
st
in
g
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
a
n
d
cl
u
st
er
-r
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
.
E
x
p
on
en
ti
at
ed
co
effi
ci
en
ts
eβ
re
p
or
te
d
.
E
x
p
on
en
ti
a
te
d
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
u
si
n
g
th
e
d
el
ta
m
et
h
o
d
.
V
en
d
o
r
co
n
tr
o
ls
in
cl
u
d
e
ve
n
d
or
ra
ti
n
g,
a
m
is
si
n
g
ve
n
d
or
ra
ti
n
g
in
d
ic
a
to
r,
a
n
d
in
d
ic
a
to
rs
fo
r
to
ta
l
vo
lu
m
e
o
f
tr
a
d
e
ve
n
d
o
rs
h
av
e
p
re
v
io
u
sl
y
en
ga
ge
d
in
.
It
em
C
on
tr
ol
s
in
cl
u
d
e
th
e
fi
rs
t
10
0
p
ri
n
ci
p
a
l
co
m
p
o
n
en
ts
o
f
it
em
li
st
in
g
te
x
t,
a
n
o
fi
n
a
li
ze
ea
rl
y
in
d
ic
a
to
r,
lo
g
g
ed
p
ri
ce
,
av
er
ag
e
p
ro
d
u
ct
ra
ti
n
g,
an
d
a
m
is
si
n
g
p
ro
d
u
ct
ra
ti
n
g
in
d
ic
a
to
r.
T
im
e
F
E
a
re
u
n
iq
u
e
in
d
ic
a
to
rs
fo
r
ev
er
y
w
ee
k
in
th
e
sa
m
p
le
.
T
h
es
e
re
gr
es
si
on
s
al
so
in
cl
u
d
e
in
d
ic
at
or
s
fo
r
ze
ro
re
v
ie
w
s/
m
en
ti
o
n
s
(n
o
t
sh
ow
n
).
*
,*
*
,*
*
*
d
en
o
te
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
10
,
5,
an
d
1
%
le
ve
ls
,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
35
T
a
b
le
6
:
D
iff
er
en
ti
al
E
ff
ec
ts
o
f
C
o
n
su
m
er
T
ex
t
S
en
ti
m
en
t
o
n
P
ro
d
u
ct
D
em
a
n
d
D
ep
en
d
en
t
V
ar
ia
b
le
:
N
u
m
b
er
of
S
al
es
p
er
W
ee
k
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
A
v
g.
V
en
d
or
R
ev
ie
w
S
en
ti
m
en
t
0
.9
8
6
6
(0
.0
4
0
6
)
A
v
g.
V
en
d
or
F
or
u
m
S
en
ti
m
en
t
1
.0
2
2
2
1
.1
0
6
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
2
8
2
)
(0
.0
3
0
7
)
(A
v
g.
V
en
d
or
R
ev
ie
w
S
en
ti
m
en
t)
×
lo
g(
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
V
en
d
o
r
R
ev
ie
w
s)
1
.0
5
5
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
1
9
3
)
(A
v
g.
V
en
d
or
F
or
u
m
S
en
ti
m
en
t)
×
lo
g(
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
F
o
ru
m
M
en
ti
o
n
s)
1
.0
9
1
5
*
*
*
(0
.0
2
5
0
)
A
v
g.
V
en
d
or
R
ev
ie
w
S
en
ti
m
en
t
of
In
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
d
C
u
st
o
m
er
s
1
.1
0
3
6
*
*
*
(0
.0
3
1
6
)
A
v
g.
V
en
d
or
R
ev
ie
w
S
en
ti
m
en
t
of
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
d
C
u
st
o
m
er
s
0.
9
9
4
0
(0
.0
3
2
8
)
A
v
g.
S
en
ti
m
en
t
of
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
d
F
or
u
m
U
se
rs
1
.0
9
0
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
3
1
2
)
A
v
g.
S
en
ti
m
en
t
of
In
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
d
F
or
u
m
U
se
rs
1
.0
9
8
6
*
*
*
(0
.0
3
0
2
)
1
{F
in
al
iz
e
E
ar
ly
}∗
(V
en
d
or
R
ev
ie
w
S
en
ti
m
en
t)
1
.1
4
3
5
*
*
(0
.0
6
1
7
)
1
{N
o
F
in
al
iz
e
E
ar
ly
}∗
(V
en
d
or
R
ev
ie
w
S
en
ti
m
en
t)
1
.0
6
0
0
(0
.0
4
0
8
)
1
{F
in
al
iz
e
E
ar
ly
}∗
(V
en
d
or
F
or
u
m
S
en
ti
m
en
t)
1
.2
1
9
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
6
9
4
)
1
{N
o
F
in
al
iz
e
E
ar
ly
}∗
(V
en
d
or
F
or
u
m
S
en
ti
m
en
t)
1
.0
8
6
1
*
*
*
(0
.0
3
2
4
)
A
v
g.
P
ro
d
u
ct
S
en
ti
m
en
t
1
.0
2
6
2
(0
.0
1
9
3
)
A
v
g.
S
en
ti
m
en
t
of
O
th
er
P
ro
d
u
ct
s
li
st
ed
b
y
V
en
d
o
r
1
.1
0
1
1
*
*
*
(0
.0
3
7
6
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
3
2
8
6
5
9
3
2
8
6
5
9
3
2
8
6
5
9
3
2
8
6
5
9
L
og
-l
ik
el
ih
o
o
d
-2
0
8
5
8
3
.0
-2
0
7
8
6
4
.0
-2
0
8
6
5
1
.9
-2
0
8
6
5
2
.3
P
-v
al
u
e
of
E
q
u
al
it
y
of
R
ev
ie
w
S
en
ti
m
en
ts
N
/
A
0.
0
2
4
1
0
.2
3
4
5
0
.0
8
0
2
P
-v
al
u
e
of
E
q
u
al
it
y
of
F
or
u
m
S
en
ti
m
en
ts
N
/
A
0
.8
6
7
9
0
.0
5
8
1
N
/
A
It
em
C
on
tr
ol
s
T
ru
e
T
ru
e
T
ru
e
T
ru
e
V
en
d
or
C
on
tr
ol
s
T
ru
e
T
ru
e
T
ru
e
T
ru
e
T
im
e
F
E
T
ru
e
T
ru
e
T
ru
e
T
ru
e
E
st
im
at
es
re
p
or
te
d
fr
om
a
P
oi
ss
on
re
gr
es
si
on
w
it
h
p
ro
d
u
ct
li
st
in
g
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
a
n
d
cl
u
st
er
-r
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
.
E
x
p
on
en
ti
at
ed
co
effi
ci
en
ts
eβ
re
p
or
te
d
.
E
x
p
on
en
ti
a
te
d
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
u
si
n
g
th
e
d
el
ta
m
et
h
o
d
.
V
en
d
o
r
co
n
tr
o
ls
in
cl
u
d
e
ve
n
d
or
ra
ti
n
g,
a
m
is
si
n
g
ve
n
d
or
ra
ti
n
g
in
d
ic
a
to
r,
a
n
d
in
d
ic
a
to
rs
fo
r
to
ta
l
vo
lu
m
e
o
f
tr
a
d
e
ve
n
d
o
rs
h
av
e
p
re
v
io
u
sl
y
en
ga
ge
d
in
.
It
em
C
on
tr
ol
s
in
cl
u
d
e
th
e
fi
rs
t
10
0
p
ri
n
ci
p
a
l
co
m
p
o
n
en
ts
o
f
it
em
li
st
in
g
te
x
t,
a
n
o
fi
n
a
li
ze
ea
rl
y
in
d
ic
a
to
r,
lo
g
g
ed
p
ri
ce
,
av
er
ag
e
p
ro
d
u
ct
ra
ti
n
g,
an
d
a
m
is
si
n
g
p
ro
d
u
ct
ra
ti
n
g
in
d
ic
a
to
r.
T
im
e
F
E
a
re
u
n
iq
u
e
in
d
ic
a
to
rs
fo
r
ev
er
y
w
ee
k
in
th
e
sa
m
p
le
.
T
h
es
e
re
gr
es
si
on
s
al
so
in
cl
u
d
e
lo
g(
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
ve
n
d
o
r
re
v
ie
w
s)
,
lo
g
(n
u
m
b
er
o
f
fo
ru
m
m
en
ti
o
n
s)
,
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
in
d
ic
a
to
rs
fo
r
ze
ro
re
v
ie
w
s/
m
en
ti
on
s
(n
ot
sh
ow
n
).
*,
**
,*
**
d
en
o
te
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
,
5
,
a
n
d
1
%
le
ve
ls
,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
36
Table 7: Impact of Sentiment On Vendor Listings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# of Listings (GRAMS) # of Listings (Agora Scrapes)
Avg. Vendor Review Sentiment 0.9920 0.9909 0.9189* 0.9166*
(0.0164) (0.0170) (0.0434) (0.0431)
log(Number of Vendor Reviews) 1.0183*** 1.0187*** 1.5613*** 1.5611***
(0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0236) (0.0236)
Avg. Vendor Forum Sentiment 1.0475 1.0349 1.0107 1.0037
(0.0933) (0.1027) (0.0390) (0.0473)
log(Number of Forum Mentions) 1.0045 1.0034 0.9864 0.9853
(0.0105) (0.0121) (0.0242) (0.0258)
% No Finalize Early Listings 0.9395 0.9335 0.7590*** 0.7537***
(0.0405) (0.0451) (0.0484) (0.0475)
Vendor Rating 0.9608 0.9625 1.0393 1.0402
(0.0462) (0.0488) (0.0276) (0.0273)
α (Dispersion Parameter) 1.0372 0.8931
(3.4874) (2.9004)
Observations 32443 32577 42300 42456
Log-likelihood -88932.5 -98952.5 -127234.7 -138740.4
Vendor Controls True True True True
Time FE True True True True
Vendor-specific Effects FE Gamma RE FE Gamma RE
Estimates reported from a Poisson regression with product listing fixed effects
and cluster-robust standard errors. Exponentiated coefficients eβ reported.
Exponentiated standard errors calculated using the delta method.Vendor
controls include vendor rating, a missing vendor rating indicator, and
indicators for total volume of trade vendors have previously engaged in. Time
FE are unique indicators for every week in the sample. *,**,*** denote
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively.
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